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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KATHY M. BETHERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 981649-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1998). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that had been seized by 
police during a warrantless search of a closed container within defendant's home. 
When reviewing a trial court's decision regarding a motion to suppress, this Court 
"should accord no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and review them for 
correctness." State v. South, 932 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied, 940 
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P.2d 1224 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). However, the trial court's factual findings 
are to be disturbed only if they are "clearly erroneous." Id. 
This issue was preserved in a pre-trial Motion to Suppress (R. 18-28, 35-36). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Kathy M. Bethers appeals from the judgment and sentence by the Honorable 
Steven L. Hansen in Fourth District Court on August 4, 1998, after a jury trial at 
which Bethers was convicted of possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone, a 
second degree felony and possession of paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a Class A 
misdemeanor. Prior to trial, Bethers filed a Motion to Suppress which was denied by 
the Honorable Lynn W. Davis. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Bethers was charged by information filed in the Fourth District Court on or 
about June 10, 1997, with the following two charges: Possession of methamphetamine 
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in a drug free zone, a second degree felony; and possession of paraphernalia in a drug 
free zone, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of the Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) and 58-37a-5(a) (R. 2). 
On December 3, 1997, Bethers filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on the 
grounds of an illegal search (R. 18-28, 35-36). After a hearing, Judge Lynn L. Davis 
denied Bethers' motion on March 11, 1998 (R. 39-40, 202). 
On August 4, 1998, a jury trial was conducted before Judge Steven L. Hansen, 
at the close of which Bethers was found guilty of both of the aforementioned counts (R. 
203). On September 21, 1998, Bethers was sentenced and was subsequently granted a 
Certificate of Probable Cause (R. 189-92, i i «i R. 203 at 276-77). 
On September 21, 1998, Bethers filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth 
District Court, and this action followed (R. 194). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The Pleasant Grove Police Department (hereinafter "the State" or "the 
Police") was called to appellant Kathy Bethers' home at approximately 10:00 p.m. on 
June 10, 1997 (R. 203 at 56; R. 202 at 5). 
2. Bethers' home is located at 100 West Adams in Utah County, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah (Id.). 
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3. The nature of the call was that shots had been fired at an intruder attempting 
to break into her home (R. 203 at 75-77; R. 202 at 5). At the scene, the officers 
entered into the Bethers' home. The purpose of this entrance into the residence was to 
investigate and "observe the crime scene" (R. 202 at 5). 
4. Bethers led the police into the master bedroom where the shooting had 
occurred (R. 203 at 119). 
5. Police discovered that Bethers' estranged husband, Ray Bethers, had fired 
two shots from inside the master bedroom at an intruder who was attempting to enter 
the home through one of the room's windows (R. 203 at 76-77). 
6. The intruder, later identified as Gary Shepherd, had dated Bethers after she 
and Ray Bethers had separated (R. 203 at 136). 
7. The specifics of the crime scene and the shooting were as follows: Shepherd, 
who had been rebuffed by Bethers, had recently been threatening her over the telephone 
(R. 203 at 76). That evening, Shepherd came to Bethers' home and banged on her 
front door while yelling obscenities (R. 203 at 195). He then attempted to break into 
the home through the master bedroom window (R. 203 at 143). After hearing this 
commotion, Ray Bethers retrieved Bethers' gun under the mattress and fired two shots 
in Shepherd's direction, who was attempting to climb through a master bedroom 
window that he had broken (Id.). 
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8. Detective Kurt Bean videotaped the bedroom and the evidence of the shooting 
found therein (R. 203 at 59; R. 202 at 22). 
9. In the master bedroom officers saw glass on the floor, spent shell casings-
one on the floor and one on the bed, a holster on the bed, and a woman's purse (R. 203 
at 66; R. 202 at 6-7). The officers also saw holes in the bedroom curtains which 
appeared to be consistent with gunshots (R. 202 at 6). 
10. Also at this time~or shortly thereafter-Officer Bean noticed a Coleman 
propane canister under the bed (R. 203 at 59). 
11. In addition, officers also saw on the bed a closed silver-colored cylinder (R. 
203 at 78; R. 202 at 7. 22). 
12. Acting without a warrant, Detective Clark Nielsen picked up and opened the 
cylinder, discovering a small bag of methamphetamine as well as a glass pipe (R. 203 
at 78; R. 202 at 12-13). 
13. Nielsen testified that he saw no other evidence which would create 
suspicions of drug activity in the home (R. 202 at 17, 20). In addition, he testified 
that, at the time he opened the cylinder, he "wasn't certain what it was related to other 
than it was something that was a new arrival there since the bed had been made up" (R. 
202 at 17). 
14. Bethers did not consent to the cylinder's search nor was her consent sought 
(R. 202 at 18). 
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15. Judge Davis denied Bethers' motion to suppress on the basis that the search 
of the cylinder was "within the legitimate investigative authority of the officers" (R. 
39). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bethers asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in denying her 
motion to suppress. Her Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the officers search 
of a closed metal cylinder that was unrelated to their investigation. Bethers will focus 
on the three pronged "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment. She concedes 
that the first and second prongs were met. However, the third prong of the "plain 
view" doctrine was violated when by the search and seizure of the cylinder. 
Accordingly, Bethers' conviction should be reversed and the matter remanded to the 
trial court with directions that the evidence is to be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BETHERS' MOTION 
TO SUPRESS BASED UPON THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF BETHERS' PROPERTY 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens and 
their property from unreasonable searches and seizures. United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 700, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1983). Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment 
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has been interpreted to require the issuance of a warrant before law enforcement 
personnel—in this case, the Pleasant Grove Police Department—are allowed to conduct a 
search and seizure of private property within a person's home. See Welch v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984) ("Searches and seizures inside a home without 
a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."). 
There are, however, various searches which are exempt from the warrant 
requirement1, but these exceptions "are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must 
be a 'showing by those who seek the exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation 
made [the search] imperative."' State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971). As such, "the State's 
burden in demonstrating both probable cause and exigent circumstances is 'particularly 
heavy' when entry into a private residence is involved." City ofOrem v. Henrie, 868 
P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah App. 1994)). 
One exception to the warrant requirement is the "plain view" exception, which 
was first set out in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 
^ome of these exceptions are: (1) searches incident to arrest, Agnello v. United 
States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925); (2) automobile exception, 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); (3) hot 
pursuit, Warden v. Hoyden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); (4) 
emergency situations, Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 
L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); (5) consent, Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 66 S.Ct. 1277, 90 
LvEd. 1477 (1946) (see, Williamson, The Supreme Court, Warrantless Searches, and 
Exigent Circumstances, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 110 (1978) at n.5). 
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L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). The "plain view" exception has three prongs: (1) The officer 
must be lawfully present at the scene; (2) the evidence must be in plain view; and (3) 
the evidence must be clearly incriminating. See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 
(Utah 1986) (citations omitted). 
A. The Plain View Exception 
Bethers concedes that the first and second prongs of the plain view exception 
have been met.2 Bethers agrees that the police were lawfully in her home; she also 
agrees that the closed cylinder was in plain view at the time it was seized. However, 
Bethers does not agree that the closed cylinder was clearly incriminating. 
With the first two prongs of the plain view exception conceded, this appeal will 
focus on whether or not the evidence in question was clearly incriminating. This Court 
in State v. Holmes, 11A P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989), discussed this point in some detail, 
and held thus: 
The third and final prong of the plain view exception requires that the 
evidence be "clearly incriminating." This "phrase been defined as 
probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity" []. In the 
2Although Bethers concedes these two points, a lawful police presence in her home 
should not provide the officers with carte blanche to conduct a general exploratory search 
of her private property. See, e.g., Hernandez v. People, 153 Colo. 316, 385 P.2d 996 
(Colo. 1963)(overruled on other grounds by People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 608 P.2d 
342, appeal after remand (Colo.) 625 P.2d 991) (holding that searches are allowed only 
if officers are looking for specific articles in a manner which would could reasonably 
uncover such articles; a search more probative than this amounts to a general exploratory 
search which runs flatly against the very core principles of the fourth amendment9 s 
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 1000.)). 
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absence of "special operational necessities, nothing less than probable 
cause will support a search and seizure under the plain view exception" 
[]. 
Holmes, 11A P.2d at 510 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).3 
The Holmes court held that probable cause did not exist to seize a roll of paper 
towels, which were later found to contain narcotics, even though he had seen defendant 
attempt to hide the roll in the car in which she was a passenger.wels out of her purse 
and attempt to hide it between the car seat and console, did not have probable cause to 
seize the paper towels, which eventually proved to contain narcotics, under the plain 
view exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The car in which 
defendant was a passenger was stopped when police suspected that she had brokered a 
prostitution deal with the car's driver. As one officer approached the vehicle's 
passenger side where defendant was seated, he observed her look back over her left 
shoulder and remove a roll of paper towels from her purse and attempt to stuff it 
between her seat and the console. 
3
"Probable cause" is indeed a nebulous concept, but it has been defined as a "fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found." Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In determining whether 
such inferences can be drawn, courts have consistently conducted a thorough contextual 
analysis of the facts at hand. Aside from an officer's hunch that s/he might be perceiving 
contraband, "other factors must be shown which, in the totality of the circumstances, 
would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that there is evidence of criminal 
activity." Holmes, 11A P.2d at 511 (emphasis added). 
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The Holmes court agreed that the first and second prongs had been met; the 
officers were investigating an alleged prostitution deal, and the roll of paper towels was 
in plain view before the officer seized it. But when it turned its attention to whether or 
not the evidence was "clearly incriminating, the court held thus: 
All we have in this case is defendant's attempt to stuff the roll of 
paper towels down between the car seat and the console []. There 
is nothing else to suggest that the item was associated with criminal 
activity, not even a subtle connection between the item and the 
suspected prostitution deal. We hold that the furtive movement, 
standing alone, was insufficient to establish the requisite probable 
cause to make the roll of paper towels "clearly incriminating/' 
Holmes, 11A P.2d at 511-12 (footnote omitted). 
The Holmes case provides a solid precedent for the case at bar. In a general 
sense, the Holmes case amounts to a reversal of a lower court's decision to deny a 
motion to suppress based on the fact that a rather innocuous item was seized when said 
item was simply not germane to the investigation of an alleged prostitution deal. The 
Holmes decision appears to be rooted in the idea that a realistic application of the third 
prong calls for a thorough analysis of context.4 
4The Holmes decision bodes well for Bethers for another reason — the seized paper 
towel roll was suppressed even though it had been fumbled with by a criminal suspect. 
Explaining that "furtive movements and gestures alone are insufficient to constitute 
probable cause for search or arrest," Id. at 511, the Holmes court relies on People v. 
Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal.3d 807, 91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449 (1970): 
[F]rom the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture can often 
be mistaken for a guilty movement. He must not only perceive the 
gesture accurately, he must also perceive it in accordance with the 
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And the instant case is not much different. The closed cylinder was not clearly 
incriminating for essentially the same reasons as those alluded to in Holmes. The 
metal cylinder—when placed at the crime scene—was simply not germane to the 
investigation of an attempted break-in and subsequent shooting. After all, the cylinder 
could have been used to store and carry numeorus items—cookies, cosmetics, money, 
coins, medicine. Thus, in detennining whether or not probable cause existed such that 
a search and seizure of the closed cylinder was authorized, it is necessary to consider 
the context of the crime scene as well as applicable legal doctrine. 
A review of the facts reveals that the police were essentially responding to a 
shooting. That is, any sort of narcotics investigation was simply not their focus.5 
actor's true intent. But if words are not infrequently ambiguous, 
gestures are even more so. Many are wholly non-specific, and can 
be assigned a meaning only in their context. Yet the observer may 
view that context quite otherwise from the actor; not only is his 
vantage point different, he may even have approached the scene with 
a preconceived notion — consciously or subconsciously — of what 
gestures he expected to see and what he expected them to mean. The 
potential for misunderstanding in such a situation is obvious. 
91 Cal.Rptr at 735, 478 P.2d at 455. Reliance on the Yolo County language is admittedly 
illustrative; but it is indeed illuminating as to what Utah courts demand of a context before 
they will conclude that evidence is "clearly incriminating." Of course, in the case at bar, 
the seized cylinder was never touched by Ray or Cathy Bethers (nor were they criminal 
suspects) before it was seized. 
5Detective Nielsen's testimony regarding his initial observations of the bedroom is 
enlightening as to his investigative intent. During direct examination, the following exchange 
occurred: 
Q. [Prosecutor]: Okay. Do you recall which bedroom it was that you were 
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When police arrived at the scene, they realized that they had much to do. Among 
other things, they needed to detain the potential burglar, ensure that the shooter did not 
pose a danger, assess the crime scene in general, and provide aid to Bethers. 
When the crime scene stretched into the master bedroom, the officers saw glass 
strewn about the floor. An empty holster was lying on the bed. There were two bullet 
holes in the wall approximately five feet from where a pistol had been fired at an 
intruder. Aside from a small camping propane tank under the bed seen by one officer 
as he was videotaping the room-and not the officer who opened the cylinder, there 
was no indication that drugs or related paraphernalia were to be found at the crime 
scene. Amidst all this mess, was one closed cylinder, lying atop the made bed next to 
a holster, a shell casing, and a woman's purse. The cylinder was opaque and closed. 
There were no markings on it which indicated that it contained drugs or paraphernalia. 
in? 
A. [Detective Nielsen]: Its master bedroom, northwest corner of the house 
[sic]. 
Q. Okay. Now tell me about the things that you observed. 
A. Ah, with the mindset that I was there to investigate a shooting, I started 
to examine the area of that and of course, on entry I saw items on the bed. 
The items included a holster, a spent casing, a live round, um, a lot of glass 
on the floor underneath the window on the west side of the room, some -
when I was examining the curtains, I observed some holes, what we term 
as gunshot residue or powder burns around the hole, which is good 
evidence for a shooting. 
(R. 203 at 77-78). 
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In fact, the cylinder was described at the Suppression Hearing as being similar to a 
toilet paper holder ( R. 202 at 12). 
To this end, Bethers asserts that the closed cylinder, when viewed within the 
context of a shooting that could have very easily become a homicide-was not clearly 
incriminating to the extent that a warrantless search and seizure was authorized under 
the "plain view" exception~or any other exception~to the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition of warrantless searches and seizures in private residences. 
Accordingly, while the officers were lawfully present in Bethers' home, and 
while the cylinder was in plain view, the cylinder was not clearly incriminating. 
Therefore, the trial court committed reversible error in denying Bethers' motion to 
suppress the evidence located in the cylinder which resulted in her conviction. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Bethers asks this Court to reverse her convictions on grounds that the trial court 
erred in its denial of her motion to suppress. Bethers asks that this matter be 
remanded to the Fourth District Court with instructions that the evidence should be 
suppressed and the matter dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^L day of June, 1999. 
7h!^rt*J>f^ 
MARGARET P. LINDS 
Counsel for Bethers 
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